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Abstract
Since the mid-eighties many Dutch municipalities have divided their organizations into
decentralized units. In addition, most municipalities have introduced management instruments
derived from the private sector, and have been paying more attention to the outputs of the
organizations. Nowadays, the political administration of a municipality says that it wants to hold
organization units accountable for realized output performance.
This paper raises the question of whether politicians use the available quantitative output
information to control their organization and in particular to evaluate the performance of top
officials. In the paper the Hopwood evaluation-styles, which originally refer to the private sector,
are further developed for the public sector.
Exploratory field research concerning the use of output data and the evaluation styles used
has been conducted in three Dutch municipalities. The aldermen in these municipalities paid
much attention to manager’s activities and the organization’s operations and relatively little to
outputs. Based on these empirical findings the paper introduces an additional evaluation style, the
’operations-conscious’ style. In this style of evaluation, quantitative outputs play some part, but
the main question is whether a manager acts as a good ’facilitator’, i.e. ensures that his
organization is functioning well. This aspect is mainly judged in a qualitative way. Besides,
important criteria are the way in which a manager deals with short-term problems and with the
politician’s opinions and personal wishes.23
Politicians, output-budgets and performance evaluation
case research in three Dutch municipalities
1
1. Introduction
Information about proposed and realized performance can contribute to the effective
control of an organization. What information should be gathered is determined by, for
example, the nature, structure and objectives of the organization, but also by the
competition facing the organization. A change in one of these elements can also mean
a change in the performance data to be gathered.
In recent years the public sector in the Netherlands, just like that in several other
Western countries, has been paying more attention to production, efficiency and
management methods and instruments derived from the private sector. This
international trend is referred to as ’New Public Management’ (see for example Hood,
1991, 1995; Van Helden, 1998, pp. 85-88; Olson, et al., 1998). As far as control over
Dutch municipalities is concerned, the emphasis has gradually shifted from budgets
(input performance) towards products (output performance) since the mid-eighties. The
municipalities have increasingly drawn up quantitative accounts of proposed and
realized performance (see Van Helden, 1998a, pp. 1-5).
This paper focuses on the way in which the performance of professional (top)
managers in municipalities is evaluated by elected politicians. The concept of
performance includes not only totals of ’finished products’ (goods or services), but also
other production aspects, such as data on operations and the quality of products. The
political administration of a municipality is divided into two groups, namely aldermen
and (other, ’ordinary’) councillors.
2 Empirical research was conducted in the
municipalities of The Hague, Groningen and Leeuwarden.
Several studies have examined the more ’technical’ aspects of performance4
measurement in government organizations, e.g. ’what should be measured and how?’,
’what is the effect of the nature of operations on performance measurement?’ and ’how
is a manager’s behaviour affected by performance measurement?’ (see for example
Haselbekke, et al., 1990; Humphrey, et al., 1993; Smith, 1993; Osborne, et al., 1995;
Van Helden and Jansen, 1996). It seems that no research has been conducted into the
way in which politicians evaluate the performances of their professional managers and
into the information they use for such performance evaluations.
The paper is organized as follows. The sections 2-4 are a (theoretical)
introduction, which ends with the formulation of a few research questions. These
research questions served as a guideline during the empirical research. A rather
extensive theoretical part is necessary. We cannot directly go to the research questions,
because we first have to find out how the economic theories presented, which mainly
concern profit organizations, can be applied in the public sector. After an introduction
to the empirical research and the research method used (section 5), the actual use of
performance or product budgets and performance evaluation in municipalities is
discussed (sections 6 and 7). In section 8 the research data are analysed and interpreted
and the ’operations-conscious’ style of performance evaluation is introduced. Finally,
section 9 contains some conclusions.
2. Output control and performance measurement
Since the mid-eighties many Dutch municipalities have divided their administrative
organizations into more or less independent units. In addition, a lot of municipalities
started to pay more attention to performance and products (output). These
developments were also encouraged by spending cuts, national legislation and the so-
called Policy and Management Instruments project (PMI).
3 Using contract
management - a form of management by objectices - and performance or output5
budgets, the municipalities made more concrete arrangements to meet performance
targets with available resources. In this way, politicians can still have general control
over more or less independent organization units (see Boston, et al. 1997, pp. 264 and
274-278; Ter Bogt and Van Helden, 1999).
Municipalities, like other authorities, have traditionally controlled organization
units by means of budgets (input control). The fact that they are now paying more
attention - at least officially - to products (outputs) means a wider scope and a shift in
emphasis as far as control is concerned. In almost all municipalities the emphasis has
shifted towards so-called businesslike control and proposed and realized production.
The PMI project and most municipalities (and the consultancy firms which were
involved) implicitly seemed to suppose that most relevant activities and outputs of
municipalities are quantitatively measurable. Especially in the initial phases of the
introduction of output budgeting a fairly uniform concept was used for all policy fields.
Now that the political administration of a municipality wants organization units
to account for performance, it seems obvious that they should consider this element
when evaluating the professional (top) managers of these units. The extent to which
budgeted and realized production tally could be discussed in job appraisal interviews
between politicians and managers. Research will show whether that is really the case.
3. Change in types of control used
Performance evaluation is usually an important element of the management and
control of an organization. If there is a shift in emphasis in the management and
control of a municipality, i.e. from inputs and observing rules towards outputs, this can
have consequences for the types of control to be used.
A government body is obviously not a commercial business. Legal certainty and
equality of rights often play an important part in a goverment organization.6
Nevertheless, now that more attention is being paid to production and management
methods derived from the private sector, business economics may become more
important for the control of a municipality. The fact that municipalities want to put
more emphasis on outputs could mean a shift in emphasis from ’action controls’
towards ’results controls’ (Merchant, 1982, pp. 45-46; 1998, pp. 27-35 and 69-81).
The aim of action controls is to influence a person’s behaviour. By means of
these controls, combined with rewards and sanctions, the management wants to
encourage employees to perform only desirable acts. This involves for example
procedural rules, supervision, separation of duties, and a superior’s approval being
required for the performance of acts. Action controls will only be useful if the
management has a clear understanding of production processes and desirable acts.
Action controls often lead to slower production processes and bureaucratic behaviour
(Merchant, 1982, pp. 49-50 and 53-54).
Results control is focused on the results of an employee’s work. If an
organization mostly uses results controls, employees will be free to act on their own
discretion, provided that they achieve good results and observe certain general rules. At
the end of a specific period the employees have to account for the results for which
they are responsible. A reward or sanction may follow, depending on the actual results.
Results controls can be used in a meaningful way only if the results are measurable and
if the management knows what results are needed to achieve their organization’s
ultimate aims (Merchant, 1982, pp. 49-50; see also Hofstede, 1981, p. 196). If the
results are defined incorrectly, employees will be encouraged to perform undesirable
acts, and if the results are barely measurable, it will be relatively easy for employees to
manipulate their performance (Merchant, 1982, pp. 49-50 and 53; Birnberg, et al.,
1983, pp. 120-126). If the outputs are only measured partially, employees will be
encouraged to give too much attention to certain (measured) acts.
The fact that municipalities are paying more attention to outputs could mean a
shift in emphasis from action controls towards results controls. The combination of7
action controls and results controls will only function well if Merchant’s conditions are
fulfilled. That means that - assuming that action controls are used - an organization
must have a clear understanding of production processes, whereas in the case of results
controls, the organization must produce clearly measurable outputs and other relevant
performances. These conditions are not always fulfilled by profit organizations and
maybe even less by public authorities like municipalities (Anthony and Young, 1994,
pp. 10-11 and 52-55; Ter Bogt and  Van Helden, 1999, pp. 6-11). However, most
Dutch municipalities formally intend to broadly introduce quantitative output measures
which they consider as relevant for their policy fields.
The greater emphasis on outputs and conditions to be filfulled have been
summarized in research question 1 as follows:
If good quantitative performance measurement is possible, will politicians
evaluate their professional managers mainly on quantitative performance data?
Understanding of production processes and the measurability of outputs and
other performances can be considered ’technical’ matters. They are connected with the
nature of operations and products of an organisation. Various other factors also play an
important part in managers’ evaluations of their subordinates’ performance and
influence what steps they will take. Some of these are dealt with in the next section.
4. Relevant factors in performance measurement
4.1 Evaluation method
Do accounting data play a part in performance evaluation? If so, it is important to
know whether these data are used rigidly or flexibly (see Hopwood, 1972, pp. 159-160;8
1974, pp. 95-117). A manager’s performance evaluation style is an important aspect of
his management style. Hopwood distinguishes three styles of performance evaluation,
which are based on research in the commercial sector, i.e. the budget-constrained, the
profit-conscious, and the non-accounting style. These styles are in essence archetypes;
to a certain extent the non-accounting style is a residual category. In practice, all kinds
of intermediate forms are possible (see Hopwood, 1972a, p. 190).
In order to make clear what the three Hopwood styles amount to in the
governmental sector, specific definitions of these styles are given below. The
definitions largely follow Hopwood’s definitions for the commercial sector, but the
meanings of the terms used for the styles differ slightly from the meanings of
Hopwood’s terms.
- The ’output-constrained style’ of performance evaluation is related to Hopwood’s
budget-constrained style. Outputs are the ’products’ (goods and services) produced by
an organization. When this style is used in the governmental sector, the question is
whether managers or their subordinates have met the quantitative targets defined in
short-term output budgets. These quantitative output budgets are not strictly financial
ones, but also refer to numbers (e.g. the number of square metres of newly paved
public roads, the number of visitors to municipal museums, or the number of
unemployed persons participating in an employment programme). The budgets also
refer to quality aspects, which can be expressed as a percentage (e.g. the percentage of
building permits issued within three months, the number of participants and the
percentage of a particular target group participating in the municipal sports
programme, the percentage of requests for social security benefits leading to appeals
and the percentage of well-founded appeals). So the budgets are expressed in various
quantitative terms.
-T h e  ’ outcome-conscious style’ of performance evaluation is more or less
equivalent to Hopwood’s profit-conscious style. ’Profit’ is replaced by ’outcome’
because profits, unlike outcomes, are usually not important goals in the public sector.9
Outcomes are effects produced by outputs, i.e. the impact of municipal activities and
outputs on society. Probably outcomes are closely linked up with politicians’ and/or a
municipal organization’s goals. For example, the output of a municipal employment
program may be defined as ’number of unemployed persons participating in an
employment programme’, and the outcome as ’number of unemployed persons who
succeed in getting a paid job’ or ’increased well-being of citizens’.
An outcome-conscious style of performance evaluation implies that managers’
performances are evaluated on their contribution to the outcomes of their
organizations. However, unambiguous data about the outcomes of governmental
activities are frequently unavailable, e.g. because the outcomes are difficult to measure,
because they can only be measured after a very long term, or because they are
influenced by many factors outside the governmental organization. Accounting data
and other quantitative data, such as data on budgets, outputs, and other performance
aspects, therefore play an important part in a manager’s evaluation in actual practice
(see also Boston et al., 1997, pp. 274-277). These data are considered then to be more
or less reliable proxies for outcomes. However, these quantitative data are used flexibly
in this style of performance evaluation. What matters most in the end is the manager’s
contribution to realizing a balance between cost minimization and/or effect
maximization and the organization’s long-term continuity. Besides accounting data, all
kinds of quantitative and qualitative data and probably also subjective information play
a part in this kind of performance evaluation.
The quantitative information concerning the municipality may include data on
budgets, costs per unit, output, percentages, and the total number of complaints made
by citizens. In addition, (quantitative) information about external developments and
developments which can only slightly be influenced by the manager and the
municipality may be relevant to the performance evaluation. Developments in the
municipality are therefore compared with national data on economic and other trends
when it concerns, for example, the total number of houses built and the number of10
square metres of new office space realized, the average scores on a yearly national test
for children leaving primary schools, and the number of new clients of the social
services. More subjective factors may also be considered, like the manager’s
interactions with subordinates and his ’entrepreneurial flair’ (which in the ’new’ public
sector may relate to factors such as enthusiasm, innovation, and risk-taking).
To summarize, all kinds of information can be considered in this kind of
performance evaluation, but accounting and other quantitative data play quite an
important part.
4
-T h e  ’ implicit style’ of performance evaluation closely resembles Hopwood’s non-
accounting style. In this type of performance evaluation accounting information and
other quantitative data play only a minor part. Probably there is no formal evaluation at
all. This style may imply that a superior, i.e. a politician, only wants to discuss his
subordinate’s performance when he is quite dissatisfied with it. The politician will
probably base his performance evaluation of the manager on changeable, rather
subjective and qualitative elements, such as the relationship between the manager and
himself, and much less on ’objective’ criteria (see also Collins et al., 1995, p. 67). The
implicit style of performance evaluation involves the use of such criteria as a
manager’s observance of rules, behaviour like a good colleague, interactions with
employees and politicians, and ’entrepreneurial flair’. In other words, subjective criteria
can play an important part in this style of performance evaluation.
This paper does not examine in a systematic way to what extent Dutch municipalities
have explicitly evaluated (top) managers’ performance in the past. Considering the
general delays in making annual accounts and other accounting information available,
it is assumed that, if performance evaluation did take place, the implicit style was used
most often. Of course, many municipalities used to focus their attention on inputs,
officially at least. This did not result in strongly financial budget-oriented performance
evaluations. After all, until the early 1990s many municipal annual accounts were not11
published until one or two years after the financial year in question. Interim financial
reports often were not drawn up at all.
5 Although available information about financial
budgets could have played a part in evaluations, in practice the most importance was
attached to observance of rules and good relations with politicians.
A person’s style of performance evaluation can be influenced by personality
traits (e.g. cognitive style), as well as by changes in his organization. An increase in
municipal departments’ independence, political control at arm’s length, and a greater
emphasis on realized outputs and other performance aspects can result in a change in a
politician’s way of evaluating professional performance. Simple straightforward
reasoning could lead one to expect that a greater emphasis on outputs will mean that
politicians choose a more output-constrained style of performance evaluation instead
of the implicit style. But assuming that politicians are especially interested in
outcomes, it is perhaps more likely that they will move to a more outcome-conscious
style in which quantitative output data play a part (see also Collins et al., 1995, pp. 67-
68). This starting point is expressed in research question 2, which is an addition to
research question 1:
If municipalities decide to use political control at a distance and emphasize
quantitative performance in their formal control mechanisms, will there be a
shift:
a. from an implicit style to another style of performance evaluation?;
b. if so, will this be a shift from an implicit style to an output-constrained or
an outcome-conscious style?
4.2 Other aspects of management style and performance evaluation
Clearly, subordinates’ ’budget behaviour’ and their superiors’ management styles are
influenced by many factors. However, this paper does not examine the way in which12
(quantitative) budgets are determined, managers’ involvement in this process, and to
what extent managers find budgets challenging (see for example Hofstede, 1967, pp.
122-161; Emmanuel et al., 1991, pp. 165-182 and 212-214). Nor does this paper
examine the way in which evaluators’ personality traits, such as extrovertedness and
cognitive style, can play a part in performance evaluations (see, for example, McGhee,
et al., 1978, pp. 692-696; Brownell, 1983, pp. 312-319).
Planning attitude is also an important part of a person’s management style. A
highly developed planning attitude means that the politician plans his normal work to a
large extent. Activities and policies are prepared thoroughly and they clearly form part
of long-term policy frameworks. The emphasis is on such aspects as the planning and
thorough preparation of policies and not on such aspects as improvisation and acting
intuitively and quickly (see also Ho and Rodgers, 1993, pp. 104-109; Scholtes, 1997,
pp. 7-11).
However, it remains to be seen whether politians really take it for granted that
more attention should be paid to outputs - and therefore to professionalism and
planning, i.e. whether they focus naturally on outputs during their day-to-day activities.
It is conceivable that a politician with a well-developed planning attitude holds
professional managers more accountable for outputs and other quantitative
performance data than a politician with a less developed planning attitude. This
assumption was originally expressed in a third research question (see also Ter Bogt,
1999a, p. 675). However, in the empirical work it proved not to be possible to research
this, because most of the aldermen interviewed turned out to have an ’improvising
style’. The rest of this paper therefore does not focus on (differences in) individual
styles of performance evalation. It concentrates on giving an overview of the forms of
evaluation used in the three municipalities.13
5. Research method and introduction to the empirical research
The empirical research for this paper can be defined as descriptive and exploratory
fieldwork (Ryan, et al., 1992, pp. 113-115). The aim of the research was to determine
whether politicians attach value to quantitative output information and whether they
use this sort of information to control an organization and to evaluate the performance
of professional top managers. This information will show whether the introduction, in
municipalities, of management instruments which are used in decentralized units of
private sector organizations also results in the use of private sector types of control and
performance evaluation by politicians who are politically responsible.
The field research took place in the municipalities of Groningen, Leeuwarden,
and The Hague, which are by Dutch standards (fairly) large municipalities with about
170,000, 90,000 and 440,000 inhabitants respectively on 1 January 1999. Large
municipalities were selected because the size of these organizations was such that there
would probably be some distance between politicians and professional (top) managers.
The research focused on official output data which were produced during planning and
control processes as well as on politicians’ evaluations.
To determine to what extent the idea of focusing on outputs had actually taken
root, first a number of official planning and control documents of two departments in
each municipality were analysed.
6 Additional information was gathered during
informal talks with employees of the organizations involved. In each case, the
documents in question were the department’s budget for 1999, its annual accounts for
1997, and one or two management reports for 1998. In a few cases, management
contracts and other memorandums or documents with important performance
information were studied as well. The number of full-time jobs (fte’s) in the six
departments in question ranged from more than 150 to 800 plus.
After the analysis of the planning and control documents, a number of aldermen
and ’ordinary’ councillors from each municipality were interviewed in the period from14
January to July 1999. A total of eight aldermen and five councillors were interviewed.
7
The interviewees were fairly diverse as far as experience, policy areas, and political
parties are concerned. No aldermen responsible for finances, personnel, and
management were interviewed, because they were generally responsible for
introducing and promoting new management instruments. It seemed more interesting
to hear the opinions of politicians who were not directly involved in the introduction of
new instruments.
The formal interviews with the 13 politicians were mainly concerned with the
use of performance information available in budgets, management reports, and annual
accounts, and with ways of evaluating the performance of professional managers.
These subjects were discussed in greater detail in the interviews with the aldermen.
The interviews ranged in length from over one hour to about two hours. A list of open
questions was used during the interviews, but other subjects could be added. A detailed
written report was made of each interview and sent to the interviewee concerned to
comment on. Any comments made by the interviewee were incorporated in the final
report on the interview.
The aldermen were interviewed because it was expected that they, charged with
the day-to-day management of a municipality, were involved in the performance
evaluation of (top) officials. ’Ordinary’ councillors usually come into contact with top
managers as well, for example during official consultations with council committees
and during informal meetings. The councillors were included in the research because it
was not immediately apparent to what extent they had (some) say in performance
evaluation, for example by expressing their opinion of municipal departments in
council committees.
Obviously, the interviews do not contain all necessary information about the
activities and working methods of local authorities (Lukka and Kasanen, 1995, pp. 75-
86). However, they indicate how the politicians concerned use performance
information and evaluate managers’ performance.15
6. Focus on outputs in planning and control processes
Have the six municipal departments mentioned above already developed sophisticated
performance or product budgets? If not, do their planning and control documents
contain at least more general, but clear quantitative data on outputs? A few general
conclusions about the six departments are presented in the following brief summary.
Although the degrees in which the departments focused on outputs differed, e.g.
because the top management of some departments was rather ’traditional’ and the
management of others was ’modern’, all departments of the three municipalities were
clearly encouraged to pay more attention to outputs. Since about 1990 the municipality
of The Hague and its departments have used performance budgets which contain
various budget items and relevant information about performance. Groningen has
incorporated performance information into its budgets since the early 1990s and has
been using product budgets since the budget year 1997. In a product budget all receipts
and expenditure are attributed to a particular product. Usually, it also contains
information about performance, such as product totals and costs per unit. Leeuwarden
used to prepare traditional financial budgets which did not contain much output
information, but it has been using product budgets since the budget year 1998. Trial
product budgets were drawn up for 1997.
The budgets that were studied contained several quantitative output goals, such
as the number of hectares of industrial estates to be sold over a year, the increase in the
number of jobs within the municipal boundaries over a particular period of time, the
number of environmental, building, traffic, and other permits to be issued, the
minimum percentage of these permits to be issued within a certain term, the number of
children participating in summer camps, the occupancy rate of sports and community
centres, the number of visitors to municipal museums, the number of pupils16
participating in truancy prevention projects, the desired fall in the sick rate concerning
teachers, the number of books borrowed from the public library, the percentage of the
population that are members of the public library, the number of subsidies to welfare
work that are granted, and the degree in which particular municipal rates have to cover
particular costs. Obviously, the municipalities did introduce certain quantitative output
goals to their departments.
However, the budgets did not contain clear quantitative data on all relevant
outputs. Generally speaking, the budgets and other documents that were analysed
contained incomplete information about output and performance. Sometimes they
yielded hardly any quantitative performance data, only irrelevant performance data or
they contained vague and not very informative performance data. Usually, no product
costs had been calculated. Moreover, products were sometimes defined in rather
abstract terms, partly due to the combining of actual products into one aggregate
product. Management reports provided some information about developments in
policies, organizations, and about major changes in plans. However, they contained
mostly financial data, as did annual accounts. Performance targets that were announced
in budgets were hardly ever commented on in annual accounts. There was not much
difference between the degrees of attention paid by the six departments to quantitative
outputs, so it seems that the concreteness and measurability of the departments’ tasks
hardly mattered.
To summarize, a certain amount of quantitative output information was
available in budgets and other official documents, but this information was far from
complete. It seems that, up to 1999, the official interest in outputs shown by politicians
and expressed in municipal policies was not strongly noticeable in planning and
control processes and in policy documents. However, it should be noted that several
employees and politicians in the municipalities emphasized that their documents were
still being improved. They put forward that future documents would contain more
quantitative output data, that the quality of the data would improve, and that the17
documents would contain more details about product costs. The implementation of
major accounting changes often takes years. This may particularly be the case in the
public sector, for example, because organizations in this sector are usually protected
from fierce external competition (see also Burns and Scapens, 2000; Ter Bogt and Van
Helden, 2000).
7. Interviews with aldermen and councillors
7.1 Introduction
This section focuses mainly on the general characteristics of the three municipalities. It
is hardly concerned with specific details about the interviewees, departments, and
municipalities. The section contains a broad overview of the interviews, including
opinions expressed by individual aldermen and councillors. A few illustrative
quotations have been added.
7.2 Value attached to quantitative performance information
The succesfull implementation of major changes in accounting systems might be
influenced by the motives for changing the accounting system and the value which
persons involved give to the changes (see Ter Bogt and Van Helden, 2000). So the
interviewees were asked some questions about these subjects.
Why do the municipalities wish to pay more attention to products and other
aspects of performance? In Leeuwarden and especially in The Hague several
interviewees referred to the (very) bad financial position and problematic  financial
management of their municipality in the early 1990s. Interviewees from the three
municipalities also mentioned the politicians’ wish to control their organization in a18
better and more businesslike manner, or the council’s wish to debate policies in more
concrete terms. Most of the interviewees also pointed to the general trend in society
towards professionalization, which prompted municipalities to strive for more insight
into production and costs. Alderman B said:
One consideration is that a municipality should keep up with the times. But our greater focus on products
and performance is also due to internal factors. In the past politicians did not have a firm enough grip on the
running of a municipal organization, partly due to a lack of all kinds of important information. They tended
to draw up lots of plans, but did not really concern themselves with their implementation.
Do the councillors and aldermen attach any importance to quantitative performance
information and current planning and control documents?
The aldermen said it was important that their professional managers should
perform well. In recent years there has been a general increase in the pressure on
organizations to perform well. The aldermen attached varying degrees of importance to
quantitatively measurable performance, depending on personality and policy area.
According to them, however, statistics tell only part of the story, as far as important
performance aspects are concerned.
Both the aldermen and the councillors said that some performance aspects could
be measured quantitatively. Nevertheless, in certain policy areas it would not be
possible to evaluate proposed and realized performances on numerical data only, in
their opinion. They stressed the importance of providing qualitative information and
explanations to complement the quantitative data. A few interviewees suggested that
more attention should be paid to benchmarking, i.e. comparisons with other
municipalities, but alderman L commented critically:
You can measure all kinds of things. ... At the moment we still do not have all the instruments we need for a
decent measurement of outputs. But you must ask yourself what you want to do with all that quantitative
information and what you expect to achieve. ... A lot of quantitative information about outputs and
performance is in fact non-information, because you cannot use it to control your organization and policies.19
... To control an organization, you need not only numerical data, but also a lot of explanatory, qualitative
information. ... If you put too much emphasis on figures, employees will focus their attention too much on
those figures, because they know that their performance will be evaluated on those criteria. Besides, if you
focus too much on output measurement, you run the risk of getting fixated on benchmarking. ... In practice,
the usual effect of benchmarking is that everyone is pretty satisfied if their municipality turns out to be about
average. And that is the danger: if you become addicted to benchmarking, you will never be a leader.
Most of the ordinary councillors still regarded quantitative performance data in
budgets, management reports and annual accounts to a certain extent as a source of
information. However, nearly all aldermen said that they hardly ever used the
information available in these documents. The interviewees generally thought that the
documents did not contain enough specific information. Alderman E remarked:
In fact, budgets and annual accounts contain only indicators of performance at the macro level, always
assuming they provide performance information. Indicators may be interesting information for an outsider,
but such general data on performance at a macro level are rather irrelevant to day-to-day management. In
that situation you need information on performance at the meso level and maybe even the micro level.
Besides, it is usually mainly financial information. ... Management reports are primarily a financial
management instrument.
The aldermen made slightly more use of management reports than of budgets and
annual accounts. They did think, however, that management reports contained a lot of
’ancient history’ as certain developments and problems had often been common
knowledge for some months (and sometimes had ceased to be problems or had been
solved). But the overview provided by management reports was sometimes
appreciated. A few aldermen and councillors were particularly interested in the risk
section of a management report.
Some of the councillors expected that, with the increasing experience of the
municipalities in drawing up budgets etc., the quality of the information in product
budgets and other documents would increase in the next few years. Not all20
interviewees shared this optimistic view.
The interviewees expressed the following opinions on planning attitude. Most of
the councillors were (quite) in favour of planning and thorough preparation of policies.
On the other hand, six of the eight aldermen said that they, like other politicians, often
had to act quickly and improvise. They admitted the importance of long-term policies
and plans, but also said that all kinds of incidents, sudden problems, and opportunities
played an important part in their day-to-day work. However, one aldermen also
explicitly mentioned that planning and quantitative output goals could diminish his
flexibility. Alderman B put it as follows:
I think that you have to act quickly as an alderman. You know that you will be an alderman for four years, if
all goes well. ... In those four years you also have to spend a lot of time doing all kinds of work besides
realizing your actual policy plans. So you often do not have the time to pursue well-considered policies;
politics is usually a hasty business and you have to face up to that.
A few aldermen indicated that they certainly used the information available in
’progress reports’ which they had developed in cooperation with municipal
departments. A progress report, which is not an official planning and control
instrument, is a report by a municipal department which is drawn up for example every
three months and which contains a brief summary of the progress of operations,
projects, and activities based on certain policies, and also points out any problems. In
addition, an alderman can obtain management information on a weekly or monthly
basis. The alderman consults with top officials on the basis of such reports and, if
necessary, will make adjustment to the organization or plans.
7.3 Evaluation of manager’s performance by politicians
How is the performance evaluation of professional managers by politicians organized
in the municipalities?21
It is the three municipalities’ custom to hold official job appraisal interviews
with managers of municipal departments. One or more members of the Municipal
Executive are involved in these job appraisal interviews. The alderman who cooperates
most closely with a particular manager is present at the interview. In Leeuwarden and
Groningen the town clerk leads the job appraisal interviews with professional
managers, or he attends the interviews. The town clerk also sees to it that an official
report of an interview and any arrangements made during the interview is drawn up.
All ordinary councillors who were interviewed said that the performance of top
officials was evaluated primarily by aldermen. In other words, aldermen are the only
politicians to play an important part in the performance evaluation of managers. All
aldermen indicated that they wanted to have a major say in the performance evaluation
of top managers, especially when they were dissatisfied with their performance.
However, most of the aldermen were of the opinion that they had limited means at
their disposal to reward or ’punish’ the performance of top officials. Alderman E said:
After a good evaluation someone can get a pat on the back or a financial incentive, for example in the form
of an extra increment or gratuity. The financial rewards for good work are relatively modest. ... No, in an
administrative organization you have only limited means to offer people who perform well more than
average financial prospects.
When they are not quite satisfied with the managers’ performance, the aldermen
use various methods to encourage them to perform better. There are only a few things
they can do to improve performance in harmony with all those concerned, in their
opinion.
Most of the aldermen regularly have an informal talk with each professional
manager. In such a ’private’ conversation a manager’s performance can be discussed in
the hope that his performance will improve. Most of the aldermen prefer to express
their dissatisfaction in this way. If the manager’s performance does not improve,
however, then the ’informal performance evaluation’ may affect an official22
performance evaluation. The alderman may decide to discuss a list of complaints
during the official job appraisal interview. The manager may also be encouraged to
attend a course, or a file on the manager’s work may be kept - a means to exert some
pressure.
Alderman H stressed the possible consequences of informal talks:
By the way, the fact that the talks were fairly informal meetings did not mean that they were not important.
The talks could have serious consequences. ...
Several aldermen said that, if these measures were ineffective, they would either
reconcile themselves to the situation or take more drastic measures. They could decide
to change a manager’s range of duties, transfer him, pressure him to leave, or dismiss
him. The aldermen concerned were the opinion that in most situations such sanctions
would be rather severe in proportion to the extent of their dissatisfaction. That does not
alter the fact that all aldermen said that they had used or would use such sanctions,
when necessary.
Up to now, this section has been mainly concerned with procedural aspects of
performance evaluation. But on what criteria do the aldermen evaluate managers’
performance? Do they attach great importance to quantitatively measurable
performance?
  The aldermen’s responses show that they tend to monitor their professional
managers’ performance carefully, but that they are not particularly interested in
quantitative data. According to the aldermen, the concept of performance cannot be
defined in quantitative terms only. A manager’s performance is determined not only by
his organization’s finished products, i.e. outputs, but also by the way in which the
organization and the manager are functioning. Information about the manager’s
activities (work processes) and the organization’s operations play an important part in
his performance evaluation.23
Alderman A attached great importance to the increased interest in performance,
but said about quantitative performance information:
It is ... important to realize that quantitative measurement is often used to determine short-term performance.
The question is: how important is that short-term performance to your long-term objectives?
Alderman B stressed the importance of successful policy implementation to the
performance evaluation of managers:
Organization development ... is a very important point in the evaluation. ... This form of performance
evaluation, which is based on the actual management of an organization, is obviously more about
impressions ... than about judging exact figures. ... In addition, we have to consider the manager’s
performance with regard to policies.
The aldermen take quantitative performance data in consideration if they think it
is useful. According to one alderman, his initial judgment about operational
performance in the field of spatial planning is based mainly on a few quantitative data
on investments such as the number of houses built, m5 realized office space, and m5
finished public space. Numerical data also play a part in the evaluation of operations in
the fields of education, minorities, culture, city sanitation, and social services. These
data include information on the number of truants per school, participation of
immigrant children in municipal sports events, sports centre utilization ratios, museum-
goers, quantities of household rubbish collected, hours of road sweeping/brushing, the
number of people having jobs in or leaving employment schemes, and orders placed
with sheltered workshops for the handicapped. The aldermen’s responses show,
however, that it is unlikely that quantitative data will become the deciding factor in
performance evaluation, even if the quality of quantitative information improves.
When they were asked to mention the most important criteria on which they
based their evaluations of professional managers, nearly all aldermen said that they24
paid special attention to the functioning of the managers’ organizations.
8 Good control
over an organization and a good work climate were considered to have a great impact
on the organization’s performance. Alderman L remarked:
My main criterion is: is the manager in control of things, is his organization functioning reasonably well? If
the organization is functioning well, then you can be fairly sure that it will perform reasonably well, that the
work that has to be done will be done, and that your objectives will be achieved in the end.
Several aldermen also mentioned the following important criteria:
- the extent to which managers succeed in achieving the objectives formulated in,
for example, an Municipal Executive’s manifesto, management contracts, and
specific policy documents;
- the extent to which managers react quickly to incidents and problems, so that an
alderman does not have to get involved;
- the extent to which a municipality’s administrative organization helps an
alderman to function well;
- the extent to which managers have a feeling for developments in politics and
policies.
Quantitative data on outputs and other performance aspects can especially be
used when performance is evaluated on the first criterion mentioned above, i.e. the
extent to which managers succeed in achieving certain objectives.
The aldermen subsequently responded to a structured list of possible criteria.
Their responses show that most of them also attach considerable value to goal-
orientedness, entrepreneurial flair, encouraging a municipal department to work
quickly and flexibly, and a co-operative attitude. Some aldermen stressed the
importance of observing rules and procedures, which may be an indication of a great
emphasis on action controls. However, most of them regarded observance of rules and
procedures as a less important criterion.
All aldermen also indicated that the degree of success in keeping within25
financial budgets played an important part in the performance evaluation of managers.
Most of the aldermen said that they wished to be informed quickly and in full of any
differences. Alderman F said:
Budget overruns are a serious matter. They can cause big problems for people, not least aldermen.
So, the interviews made clear that, generally speaking, the aldermen considered
several factors to be (quite) important for the performance evaluation of managers.
Outputs and other quantitatively measurable performance aspects play a part in the
performance evaluation, but they are not the deciding factors.
8. Interpretation: ’operations-conscious’ style of performance evaluation
The research shows that the three municipalities do not pay much attention to
quantitative performance data in the official planning and control documents that were
studied - although they are now more concerned with it than in the past. As yet the
aldermen do not evaluate the performance of (top) managers primarily on quantitative
performance data. A possible explanation is that the public sector’s professed interest in
outputs is mainly a matter of rhetoric and rituals, or a (quasi-) striving for rationality
(Miller, 1994, pp. 8-10; see also Humphrey et al., 1993, pp. 15-18; Meyer, 1994, pp.
124-128; Olson et al., 1998a, pp. 455-458). However, there might be other relevant
reasons for the aldermen’s behaviour. It seems therefore worthwhile to examine the
developments in the three municipalities in more detail.
The modest role of quantitative performance data may be due to the fact that not
all performance aspects can be measured quantitatively. The public sector has always
conducted many activities that are difficult to measure (Mintzberg, 1996, pp. 79-80).
Officially, the municipalities may want to focus on outputs and therefore on results
control. But in practice, a largely quantitative performance evaluation is possible in26
only a few cases, according to the councillors and aldermen. This may be due to the
low quality of current quantitative data. The alderman think, however, that qualitative
information will remain important for performance evaluation, even if it were possible
to improve the quality of quantitative data. Several aldermen also attach some
importance to observance of rules and procedures, but most of the aldermen do not
emphasize this criterion (see research question 1).
It follows from the conditions formulated by Merchant that barely measurable
outputs make it difficult for an organization to shift the emphasis from action controls
(have the ’right’ acts been performed?) towards results controls (result-based control).
For certain tasks and activities, like policy preparation, municipalities probably also do
not have a clear understanding of the production processes underlying them. In that
situation even ’traditional’ action controls cannot be used properly, so control is more
like social and ritual control (’clan control’; Ouchi, 1979, p. 843).
9 In practice, the
selection of a method of performance evaluation can also depend on the extent to
which outputs are influenced by external circumstances (cf. Govindarajan, 1984, pp.
128-129).
The research does not show the importance of planning attitude for the use of
quantitative output data in performance evaluation. Most of the aldermen stress that
they work quickly and tend to improvise. Conclusions about the role of planning
attitude can be drawn only when it has become clearer how planning-oriented
aldermen evaluate performances. Only a limited number of people were interviewed
for this study, so it is not possible to draw general conclusions. However, the finding
that six out of eight aldermen were only moderately interested in planning, suggests
that the planning attitude deserves to be looked into in more detail in future research.
The aldermen think it is important that their professional managers should
perform well. Generally speaking, the municipalities and politicians have become more
interested in performance. However, the aldermen do not really use an outcome-
conscious method of performance evaluation (and certainly not an output-constrained27
style). Only limited importance is attached to accounting data and other quantitative
information. Even when the quality of quantitative data improves sufficiently, it is
likely that qualitative information will still play an important part in performance
evaluation. The aldermen’s method of performance evaluation is not implicit in style
either. The aldermen show a strong and probably rather consistent interest in the
performances of their managers. All kinds of factors which affect the long-term
functioning and outputs of the organization have a great impact on their evaluation of
top managers’ performances. The conclusion can therefore be that their evaluation style
is not implicit (see research question 2a). However, the evaluation style used is neither
really output-constrained or outcome-conscious (see research question 2b).
Perhaps the politicians’ method of performance evaluation should be regarded as
a fourth style, which should be added to the three styles which were derived from the
Hopwood-styles. This fourth style could be called the ’operations-conscious style’
(’facilitating style’). In this case, the question is whether a manager acts as a good
’facilitator’, i.e. ensures that his organization is functioning well, and performs activities
which will enable an alderman to function well in the short and long run. Quantitative
outputs play some part in this method of evaluation, but are not its main focus. In the
operations-conscious style, a lot of attention is paid to the activities of managers and
processes in the organization and relatively little to its outputs. The interviews
indicated that the aldermen generally evaluated their managers in such a way. The
outcome-conscious style more strongly focuses on outputs - as a proxy for the
outcomes -, whilst it pays less attention to activities and processes.
Tailoring the operations-conscious style somewhat more to the political
environment in which a municipal organization is functioning, the style could involve:
- on the one hand, some attention being paid to quantitative output data, but more
emphasis being placed on all kinds of other performance aspects (manager’s
activities) which affect the functioning of the organization and which are
regarded as being important to long-term outputs and outcomes;28
- on the other hand, attention being paid to the way in which a manager deals with
all kinds of short-term problems and politicians’ subjective or personal opinions
and wishes.
9. Conclusions
The field research shows that official planning and control documents in the Dutch
municipalities of Groningen, Leeuwarden and The Hague contain some quantitative
information about outputs and related performance aspects. However, this information
is often incomplete. According to the aldermen and ’ordinary’ councillors concerned,
the quality of these documents leaves something to be desired. Most of the councillors,
and the aldermen in particular, do not make much use of the information available in
planning and control documents. A few aldermen make frequent use of progress
reports for internal purposes which are drawn up for example every three months.
The following can be said about the performance evaluation of top managers.
According to the aldermen, the concept of performance cannot be defined in terms of
quantitative data on outputs and related performance aspects only. Performance is also
determined by a number of specific and/or subjective factors, such as a ’feeling for
politics’ and a ’co-operative attitude’. However, most of the criteria used in performance
evaluation relate to managers’ activities (work processes) that affect the current or
future functioning of their organizations. Some aldermen explicitly stated that these
activities also have an indirect effect on current and future outputs.
The nature of various criteria mentioned by the aldermen is an indication that
they tend to judge a manager on his role as a ’facilitator’. The act of facilitating includes
such activities as seeing to it that his department is well-organized, ’helping’ the
alderman concerned, showing enterprise, and foreseeing new developments.
Perhaps most of the aldermen are of the opinion that a department’s output29
performance will be good if only the manager is a good facilitator. Nevertheless,
(quantitative data on) outputs still play a minor part in performance evaluation. This
may be due to the (current) lack of high quality output data, the aldermen’s planning
attitude or to other factors. According to most of the aldermen, their work usually
forces them to act quickly, improvise, and pay relatively little attention to planning.
Their tendency to put limited emphasis on planning could mean that they also tend to
pay little attention to the information in planning and control documents.
Politicians’ limited use of quantitative output data can probably be explained by
several factors. For example, it could take a long time to actually implement major
accounting changes and to change habits. Several politicians may have a low interest in
quantitative data and planning because they are of the opinion that they are the most
succesful in their political activities when they can act flexibly. Or perhaps it is very
difficult to measure all relevant performance aspects quantitatively. No definite
conclusions can be drawn from the present research, but future research may elucidate
such and other aspects.
  Anyhow, several of the findings mentioned above are probably not only true for
organizations in the public sector. Managers in commercial organizations, too, often
use qualitative information, e.g. from conversations, personal impressions and external
contacts, while they often do not make much use of official accounting reports (see for
example Emmanuel et al., 1991, pp. 87-104; McKinnon and Bruns, 1992, pp. 105-124
and 215-216). Qualitative information and information about operations can also play
an important part in the performance evaluation of employees in profit organizations.
It can be concluded that the politicians interviewed in the Dutch municipalities
of Groningen, Leeuwarden and The Hague had only slightly shifted their attention to
results control, outputs and instruments like output budgets. They attached relatively
little value to quantitative output data and did not use an output-constrained or an
outcome-conscious evaluation style. Rather, most of the politicians interviewed
evaluated the performances of their top managers in an operations-conscious style.30Notes
1. The author is indebted to Professor G. Jan van Helden (University of Groningen) and Professor
Robert W. Scapens (University of Manchester and University of Groningen) for their helpfull
comments.
2. In the Netherlands, the municipal council is the highest authority in a municipality. Municipal
council elections are held every four years. Citizens can elect representatives who are supposed to
stand for a particular political programme. In practice, almost all representatives are put forward by
political parties, including local parties. The elected representatives together form the municipal
council. The members of the municipal council elect from their midst the members of the Executive
Committee (the aldermen). The number of councillors and the number of aldermen depend on the
number of inhabitants of a municipality. In municipalities with about 30,000 inhabitants or more,
being a member of the Executive Committee is a full-time job in practice. For the other councillors
(the ’ordinary’ members), being a member of the council is mostly only a part-time activity. They are
not directly involved in the everyday governance of the municipality. When the majority of the
councillors pass a vote of no-confidence in an alderman, he loses his position and becomes an
’ordinary’ councillor again.
Unlike these politically elected members of the municipal council, the mayor is appointed
by the Crown. The mayor is the chairman of both the municipal council and the Executive
Committee.
Professional managers and other employees of the municipal organization are usually not
politically appointed. The duration of their contracts is unrelated to the four-year term of the
municipal council.
3. The Dutch name for the PMI project is Beleids- en Beheers Instrumentarium (BBI). The PMI
project was an initiative of the Ministry of Home Affairs to stimulate municipalities to apply
business tools, such as output budgeting, responsibility accounting and cost allocation (Van Helden,
1998, pp. 85-90).
4. The balanced scorecard developed by Kaplan and Norton can be regarded as a more concrete
version of Hopwood’s profit-conscious style (Gelderman, 1998, pp. 4-5).
5. Together with output control, some elements of an output-constrained style came into vogue in the
1990s. Formally, various quantitative output data are evaluated now and not only the financial
budgets.
6. The following departments were studied: the Department of Education, Culture and Welfare, and
the Town Planning Department in The Hague; the Department of Education, Sports and Welfare,
and the Department of Social Affairs and Employment in Groningen; the Town Planning
Department and the Department of Welfare in Leeuwarden. These six departments represent a fairly32
wide range of the activities in large municipalities. Central Administrative Departments, which are
engaged in co-ordinating activities and supporting the council, were not included in this study,
because these departments might only want to set a good example to others in the municipal
organizations.
7. The interviewees, aldermen and other councillors, were promised anonymity to encourage them to
speak candidly during the interviews. The letters A to M refer to the interviewees and the order in
which they were interviewed. Interviews were held with 3, 2, and 3 aldermen and 1, 2, and 2
councillors in Groningen, Leeuwarden, and The Hague respectively. The interviewees were selected
in consultation with contact men from the municipalities concerned.
Most of the ’ordinary’ councillors were (very) experienced; they had been on the councils for
about 3 years to more than 15 years (on average more than 8 years). The aldermen had been in office
for about 1 to 10 years, apart from their years as ordinary councillor. The 5 councillors who were
interviewed included 4 chairmen of council committees (a council committee is an official group of
councillors from different political parties who are involved in specific policy areas). The number of
interviewees from a particular party is roughly proportional to the number of seats of the party on
the three municipal councils (see CBS, 1999, pp. 41-55).
8. First, the aldermen were asked to mention the criteria on which they evaluated managers’
performance. The interviewers did not suggest any criteria. This paper is mainly based on the
responses to the questions. At a later stage in the interviews, the aldermen were given a structured
list of specific evaluation criteria. The aldermen could indicate to what extent they thought these
criteria were of importance. Their answers to the questions in this structured list and their first,
unprompted responses tally. The terms used are not quite the same, but their answers do not differ in
content.
9. Clan control involves asking such questions as ’are employees working according to certain rules
and customs?’ (although it is not clear why those rules and customs have to be complied with) and
’are employees acting in conformity with group norms?’.33
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